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INTRODUCTION 
Internet domain name registration has become a hot issue over 
the last few years.  It has been the subject of much litigation and 
was a reason why Congress substantially amended federal 
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trademark statutes thrice in four years.1  This Article will discuss 
the most recent federal statute concerning Internet domain name 
registration and will provide both federal appellate and district 
court cases that have interpreted and applied this new law.  This 
Article will also attempt to note the changes that this new statute 
has made, as well as the similarities and differences between the 
new law and traditional trademark law that has been previously 
applied. 
I. THE MOST RECENT LAW 
On November 29, 1999, Congress enacted the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).2  The 
ACPA was the first federal statute enacted to specifically address 
problems associated with Internet domain name disputes.  It has 
become a powerful tool for owners of protected marks.3  This law 
made it illegal for a person to register or to use with the bad 
faith intent to profit from an Internet domain name that is 
identical or confusingly similar to the distinctive or famous 
trademark or Internet domain name of another person or 
company.4  The language of the ACPA serves as a method for 
trademark owners to obtain control of domain names prior to the 
commencement of litigation.5 
 
1 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 
985, 98586 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)); Trademark 
Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, §§ 3(a)(2), 5, 113 Stat. 219, 220 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3), (c)(2)); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A54549) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)). 
2 Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d)). 
3 See Elizabeth Robison Martin, Too Famous to Live Long! The Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act Sets Its Sights to Eliminate Cybersquatter Opportunistic Claims 
on Domain Names, 31 ST. MARYS L.J. 797, 832 (2000). 
4 Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)). 
5 This can be accomplished by the use of what are commonly known as ACPA cease-
and-desist letters.  These letters, usually sent by attorneys of protected mark holders, 
were around prior to the enactment of the ACPA.  The ACPAs language, however, has 
been specifically incorporated into cease-and-desist letters sent to potential 
cybersquatters, thus providing a strong means of obtaining ownership of a domain name 
without the need for litigation.  For an example of a post-ACPA cease-and-desist letter, 
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Congress designed the ACPA to deter the misuse of domain 
name registration.6  Specifically stated, Congress intended 
to protect consumers and American businesses, to promote 
the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in 
the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith 
and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet 
domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill 
associated with such marksa practice commonly referred 
to as cybersquatting.7 
In other words, in the typical situation that the ACPA seeks to 
address, individuals register domain names that consist of famous 
trademarks and then attempt to sell (or perhaps more accurately, to 
ransom) those domain names to the trademark owners, thereby 
profiting from the goodwill associated with the trademark.8  The 
goal behind the ACPA is to control problems associated with 
cybersquatters.  Cybersquatters have been described as those who 
register a trademark as a domain name with the intent of profiting 
from it by selling it, usually to the trademark owner.9  Although it 
does not provide absolute protection to protected marks, the ACPA 
 
see Richard Keyt, Sample Cease & Desist Letter to Send to a Domain Name Owner 
Whose Domain Name is Infringing on a Trademark, KeytLaw, at 
http://www.keytlaw.com/urls/c&d.htm (last modified Dec. 14, 2001). 
6 See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 9 (1999); CNN v. cnnews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 
(E.D. Va. 2001) (stating that the ACPAs purpose is made manifest in its title: it is 
designed to deter, prohibit and remedy cyberpiracy, which is defined in the legislative 
history as the bad faith registration or use of a domain name) (citations omitted). 
7 S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4. 
8 Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 880 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
9 Monica Kilian, Cybersquatting and Trademark Infringement, 7 E LAWMURDOCH 
UNIV. ELECS. J. OF L. 26, ¶ 11 (Sept. 2000), at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/ 
issues/v7n3/kilian73.html.  It should be noted that the Senate Report for the ACPA 
described cybersquatting as the deliberate, bad-faith, and abusive registration of 
Internet domain names in violation of trademark owners. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4.  
This definition may be too constrictive.  See also Jonathan M. Eisenberg, A Guide to the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, J. INTERNET L. 2, ¶ 1 (Mar. 2000) 
(identifying a quintessential cybersquatter [as] the person who, for about $70, is first to 
register the Internet domain name of a well-known company or trademark . . . and then 
tries to ransom the domain name back to the hapless company or trademark holder), at 
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/ journal/jil_march00_1.html. 
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does provide a remedy for any bad faith appropriation of the 
mark.10  The ACPA also protects consumers.11 
The law is as follows: 
(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner 
of a mark, including a personal name which is protected as 
a mark under this section, if, without regard to the goods or 
services of the parties, that person 
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, 
including a personal name which is protected as a mark 
under this section; and 
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that 
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the 
time of registration of the domain name, is identical 
or confusingly similar to that mark; 
 
10 Serena C. Hunn, AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: A Powerful Remedy 
in Domain Name Disputes? Or a Threat to Electronic Commerce (stating that the bill 
does not provide blanket protection to the trademark owner or owner of a personal name 
protected as a mark, rather it provides a remedy against the bad faith appropriation of 
the mark), at http://www.fmew.com/archive/cybersquat (last modified Aug. 2000) ; see 
also BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (Congress clearly intended to use the bad faith element of the statute as a way to 
narrow the breath of the statute.). 
11 See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 5. 
The practice of cybersquatting harms consumers, electronic commerce, and the 
goodwill equity of valuable U.S. brand names, upon which consumers 
increasingly rely to locate the true source of genuine goods and services on the 
Internet.  Online consumers have a difficult time distinguishing a genuine site 
from a pirate site, given that often the only indications of source and 
authenticity of the site, or the goods and services made available thereon, are 
the graphical interface on the site itself and the Internet address at which it 
resides.  As a result, consumers have come to rely heavily on familiar brand 
names when engaging in online commerce.  But if someone is operating a web 
site under another brand owners trademark, such as a site called 
cocacola.com or levis.com, consumers bear a significant risk of being 
deceived and defrauded, or at a minimum, confused.  The costs associated with 
these risks are increasingly burdensome as more people begin selling 
pharmaceuticals, financial services, and even groceries over the Internet.  
Regardless of what is being sold, the result of online brand name abuse, as with 
other forms of trademark violations, is the erosion of consumer confidence in 
brand name identifiers and in electronic commerce generally. 
Id. 
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(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at 
the time of registration of the domain name, is 
identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that 
mark; or 
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by 
reason of section 706 of title 18, United States 
Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States 
Code. 
(B) 
(i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith 
intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may 
consider factors such as, but not limited to 
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property 
rights of the person, if any, in the domain name; 
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of 
the legal name of the person or a name that is 
otherwise commonly used to identify that person; 
(III) the persons prior use, if any, of the domain 
name in connection with the bona fide offering of 
any goods or services; 
(IV) the persons bona fide noncommercial or fair 
use of the mark in a site accessible under the 
domain name; 
(V) the persons intent to divert consumers from the 
mark owners online location to a site accessible 
under the domain name that could harm the 
goodwill represented by the mark, either for 
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or 
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of 
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, 
or endorsement of the site; 
(VI) the persons offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise 
assign the domain name to the mark owner or any 
third party for financial gain without having used, 
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or having an intent to use, the domain name in the 
bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the 
persons prior conduct indicating a pattern of such 
conduct; 
(VII) the persons provision of material and 
misleading false contact information when applying 
for the registration of the domain name, the 
persons intentional failure to maintain accurate 
contact information, or the persons prior conduct 
indicating a pattern of such conduct; 
(VIII) the persons registration or acquisition of 
multiple domain names which the person knows are 
identical or confusingly similar to marks of others 
that are distinctive at the time of registration of such 
domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of 
others that are famous at the time of registration of 
such domain names, without regard to the goods or 
services of the parties; and 
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in 
the persons domain name registration is or is not 
distinctive and famous within the meaning of 
subsection (c)(1) of section 43.12 
The mere registration of a domain that may be similar to a 
famous trademark name is insufficient for a showing of bad faith 
intent to profit as required under the ACPA.13  Bad faith intent to 
profit requires that there be a standard used to determine the 
mental state of the registrant.  The factors delineated above in 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(B)(i) serve as a basis for courts to make a 
determination of whether such a state of mind exists, but courts are 
not confined to these factors in their analysis.14  Because courts are 
 
12 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (2000). 
13 See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
14 See Gregory B. Blasbalg, Comment, Masters of Their Domains: Trademark Holders 
Now Have New Ways to Control Their Marks in Cyberspace, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 563, 56970 (2000) (noting that these factors are simply guidelines, not an all-
inclusive list of factors to be used by the courts). 
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not limited to these statutory factors, the ACPA affords courts 
sufficient discretion.15 
The ACPA also sets forth a complete defense for registrants 
alleged to have violated the ACPA.  Consistent with principles of 
trademark and other intellectual property law, the ACPA provides 
a complete fair use defense to domain name registration.16  The 
ACPA states that bad faith intent shall not be found in any case in 
which the court determines that the person believed and had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was 
a fair use or otherwise lawful.17 
As noted, the ACPAs purpose is to combat and control the evil 
cybersquatter.  Congress enacted the ACPA to clarify trademark 
owners rights, to provide remedies for mark owners subjected to 
abusive domain name registration practices, and to deter this type 
of behavior.18  The Senate, in its report on the ACPA, pinpointed 
the types of behavior that it intended to deter.19  The Senate 
recognized that the following behavior needed to be addressed: 
• the securing and locking up of domain names with 
the intent to ransom these domain names off for a 
huge profit, whether the profit be from the owner of 
the protected mark, or anyone else who just happens 
to be the highest bidder; 
• the preying on Internet surfer confusions by 
misusing a domain name to divert customers from 
the mark owners site to another site; 
• those in direct competition with owners of a 
protected mark who register a domain name first; 
 
15 See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 10 (Courts must ultimately weigh the facts of each case 
and make a determination based on those facts whether or not the defendant registered, 
trafficked in, or used the domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of 
the mark of another.). 
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
17 Id. 
18 See S. REP. NO. 106-140. 
19 See id., at 57. 
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• behavior that involves those who target distinctive 
marks to defraud consumers, including to engage in 
counterfeiting activities.20 
Congress found that cyberpiracy and its effects result in consumer 
fraud and public confusion as to the true source or sponsorship of 
goods and services; impairs electronic commerce . . . ; deprives 
legitimate trademark owners of substantial revenue and consumer 
goodwill; and places unreasonable, intolerable, and overwhelming 
burdens on trademark owners in protecting their valuable marks.21  
The goals of the ACPA demonstrate that Congress harbors an 
aversion to cybersquatters.22  In creating the ACPA to deter this 
behavior, members of Congress believed that they had drafted an 
effective and equitable law.  Senator Orrin Hatch, a leading 
proponent of the ACPA, stated that it balances the property 
interests of trademark owners with the interests of Internet users 
who would make fair use of others marks or otherwise engage in 
protected speech online.23 
Prior to the ACPAs enactment, courts utilized traditional 
trademark law principles to resolve domain name disputes.24  The 
 
20 See id. 
21 Id. 
22 See, e.g., Oliver R. Gutierrez, Get Off My URL! Congress Outlaws Cybersquatting in 
the Wild West of the Internet, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 166 
(2000) (citing 145 CONG. REC. S14986, 15019 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999) and 145 CONG. 
REC. S7325, 7335 (daily ed. July 29, 1999)). 
23 S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 9. 
24 See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999);  
Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999); Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entmt, Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Data Concepts, Inc. v. 
Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998); Shades Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 
76 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 1999); CCBN.com, Inc., v. C-call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 
106 (D. Mass. 1999); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 
1999); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998); Lockheed Martin 
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Juno Online Servs., 
L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Cardservice Intl, Inc. v. 
McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 
1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
Blasbalg, supra note 14, at 566 (Before the enactment of the ACPA the most successful 
remedy available to the victims of cybersquatting was the use of federal trademark 
law.). 
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two most common legal theories advanced for resolving these 
disputes were trademark infringement and trademark dilution.  
Traditional trademark infringement law seeks to protect both 
marks and consumers from the use of protected marks in 
commerce in a manner that causes general public confusion, a 
likelihood of confusion, or deception.25  Traditional trademark 
dilution, recently codified in 1996,26 seeks to prevent commercial 
use of protected marks when that use diminishes the distinctive 
quality of the marks.27  The ACPA demonstrates a connection with 
traditional principles, as well as an evolution of the law.  Indeed, 
the ultimate goal of traditional trademark lawof striking a 
balance between the protections afforded to the owner of a mark 
and the fair use of that markresembles Senator Hatchs intent 
when creating the ACPA.28 
Although it is based on traditional trademark principles,29 the 
ACPA is narrowly tailored to deal with problems arising from 
domain name disputes.  One major difference between traditional 
trademark law and the ACPA, for example, is that the ACPA does 
not require that the domain name at issue be used in commerce.  
The ACPA applies to all domain names registered, trafficked in, or 
used, regardless of whether the names are intended for commercial 
purposes.30  Traditional trademark infringement and dilution, 
codified in the Lanham Act,31 require that marks be used in 
commerce for a trademark claim to exist.32  Additionally, the 
ACPA provides remedies for domain names that are confusingly 
 
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)1127 (2000); see also Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 873. 
26 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
27 See id. 
28 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
29 See, e.g., Neil L. Martin, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: 
Empowering Trademark Owners, But Not the Last Word on Domain Name Disputes, 25 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 591, 596 (2000) (stating that the structure of the ACPA triggers a 
trademark infringement analysis). 
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
31 Id. § 1051. 
32 See id. § 1125(a)(1) (stating that any person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof). 
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similar to marks,33 which is a departure from the former 
likelihood of confusion test.34 
Under the ACPA, a plaintiff must prove three key elements.  
First, the plaintiff must show that the mark embodied within the 
text of the domain name is either distinctive or famous.35  Second, 
after this classification is determined, the plaintiff must show that 
the domain name is identical, confusingly similar, or dilutive of a 
protective mark.36  Third, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant possessed a bad faith intent to profit when registering 
the protected mark as a domain name.37  If the plaintiff proves 
these elements, then a court may order the forfeiture or 
cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain 
name to the owner of the mark.38  When a personal name, rather 
than a trademarked term, is the subject of the domain name 
dispute, federal trademark law requires a showing that the 
registrant possessed specific intent to profit;39 however, case law 
 
33 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I). 
34 See id. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (noting that infringement may exist when a protected mark is 
issued in a manner that is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities 
by another person). 
35 See Jason H. Kaplan, Comment, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: 
Will It End the Reign of the Cybersquatter?, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 43, 54 (2000) (stating 
that under the ACPA, the level of distinctiveness or fame controls the level of protection 
the mark receives). 
36 See Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 472 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the ACPA distinguishes between a distinctive mark and a 
famous mark.  Liability is imposed with respect to a distinctive mark if the domain 
name is identical or confusingly similar.  Liability is imposed with respect to a famous 
mark if the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark.) 
(citations omitted). 
37 See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Jennifer Mae 
Slonaker, Comment, Conflicting Interpretations of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
Create Inadequate Famous Mark Protection, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 121, 134 (2000). 
38 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C). 
39 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (stating that [a]ny person who registers a domain 
name that consists of the name of another living person, or a name substantially and 
confusingly similar thereto, without that persons consent, with the specific intent to 
profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or any 
third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person), with 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring a bad faith intent to profit) (emphasis added).  Case law has 
not yet, however, made such a distinction.  See, e.g., Cline v. 1-888-Plumbing Group, 
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rarely, if ever, makes such a distinction.40  This Article will address 
the bad faith intent to profit standard and provide an analysis of 
various cases addressing Internet domain name disputes since the 
ACPAs enactment. 
II. THE CASES 
A. The First Appellate Bite at the ACPA Apple 
Since the ACPAs inception on November 29, 1999, various 
federal courts have tackled issues that the ACPA was intended to 
address.  The most notable case to date is the first federal appellate 
decision utilizing the ACPA to decide a domain name dispute: 
Sportys Farm L.L.C. v. Sportmans Market, Inc.41 In this Second 
Circuit case, both sides appeared to be suing each other for 
anything and everything.  Briefly stated, Plaintiff-Counter-
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Sportys Farm L.L.C. 
(hereinafter Sportys Farm) and Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-
Counter-Claimant-Appellee-Cross Appellant Sportsmans Market, 
Inc. (hereinafter Sportsmans) disputed the rights to the domain 
name sportys.com.42 
 
Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (making no distinction between personal 
names and famous marks and generally stating that it is the bad faith intent to profit 
standard that is required for a civil action pursuant to the ACPA). 
40 See, e.g., Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (D. Colo. 
2000) (noting that the pivotal question is whether [the defendant] has a bad faith intent 
to profit from the use of the mark, and making no distinction for different standards 
when a personal name is the subject of the litigation as compared to a marked term). 
41 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000).  This case was 
initially argued on March 17, 1999, prior to the passing of the ACPA.  While the ACPA 
was not an issue before the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, which 
heard the initial argument prior to this appeal, the Second Circuit decided to use the 
ACPA.  See id. at 492 (This case originally involved the application of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) to the Internet.  While the case was pending on appeal, 
however, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) was passed and 
signed into law.  That new law applies to this case.) (citations omitted). 
42 See id.  There was another party listed in the case, Third-Party-Defendant-Appellee 
Omega Engineering, Inc. (the parent company of Sportys Farm), who did not contest 
anything on appeal because it prevailed on all claims made against it . . . .  Id. at 495 
n.8. 
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Sportsmans was a mail order catalog that sold products 
associated with aviation, tools, and home accessories.43  The 
company used the term sporty as a means for consumers to 
identify its products.44  Sportsmans used this term for almost forty 
years prior to the case and registered it as a trademark 
approximately fifteen years before commencement of the suit.45  
Sportsmans spent a great deal of money advertising the term 
sporty for use with the sale of its products and built its company 
telephone numbers around this term for consumer convenience.46 
Sportys Farm, founded in 1996 to sell Christmas trees, was a 
subsidiary company to Omega Engineering, Inc. (hereinafter 
Omega).47  Prior to the creation of Sportys Farm, Omega and 
another subsidiary company, Pilots Depot, created in 1995 for the 
purposes of selling products associated with aviation, registered 
the domain name sportys.com.48  Omega owner Arthur Hollander, 
who was a pilot who received Sportsmans catalogs and thus was 
aware of the sportys trademark, created both Sportys Farm and 
Pilots Depot.49  Additionally, Sportys Farms manager, Ralph S. 
Michael, served as the CEO for Omega.50 
When Sportsmans learned about the registration of the 
sportys.com domain name, Sportys Farm brought a declaratory 
action to determine who held the rights to the domain name.51  
Sportys Farms apparent reason for choosing the sportys.com 
domain name was that manager/CEO Michael 
always thought of and referred to the Pennsylvania land 
where Sportys Farm now operates as Spottys Farm.  The 
origin of the name . . . derived from a childhood memory 
[Michael] had of his uncles farm in upstate New York.  As 
a youngster, Michael owned a dog named Spotty.  Because 
the dog strayed, his uncle took him to his upstate farm.  
 
43 Id. at 49394. 
44 Id. at 494. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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Michael thereafter referred to the farm as Spottys farm.  
The name Sportys Farm was . . . a subsequent derivation.52 
Because it was reported that Hollanderwho had knowledge of 
the sportys term and its association with aviation products
registered the name, and not Michael, the court quickly invalidated 
this excuse.  The Second Circuit aptly noted that there was no 
evidence in the record that Hollander was considering starting a 
Christmas tree business when he registered sportys.com or that 
Hollander was ever acquainted with Michaels dog Spotty.53 
Initially, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut 
had based its determination on both traditional trademark 
infringement and dilution principles.54  On the traditional 
infringement claim, the district court held that Sportys Farm did 
not violate Sportsmans trademark rights in the use of sportys.com, 
because there was no likelihood of consumer confusion; 
Sportsmans and Sportys Farm operated wholly unrelated 
businesses [and t]herefore, confusion in the marketplace is not 
likely to develop.55  On dilution grounds, however, the district 
court found that the term sportys was a famous mark entitled to 
protection, and Sportys Farms use of this term effectively 
compromise[d] Sportsmans Markets ability to identify and 
distinguish its goods on the Internet.56  Accordingly, the district 
court ordered Sportys Farm to relinquish the sportys.com domain 
name.57 
Between the time the district court heard the case and the case 
was presented to the Second Circuit, the ACPA was enacted.  
Although the ACPA was not available prior to the appeal, the 
Second Circuit noted that its purpose was to address this type of 
domain name dispute and other circumstances where ordinary 
trademark law principles would not be specifically on point or 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Sportys Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsmans Mkt., Inc., No. 3:96CV0756, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23290, at *14 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 1998). 
56 Id. at *23. 
57 Id. at *28*29. 
6-SILBERLIGHT FORMAT  12/12/02 4:23 PM 
282 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:269 
offer strong enough protections to trademark holders.58  The 
Second Circuit therefore applied the ACPA to this case.59 
The Second Circuit found that the term sportys was 
distinctive and thus entitled to protection under the ACPA.60  
Moreover, the court reasoned that this term, as used in the domain 
name sportys.com, was confusingly similar to the mark 
sportys, despite the fact that there was an apostrophe between 
the letter y and the second s in the protected mark but not in 
the domain name.61  The Second Circuit noted that although this 
difference prevented the domain name from being precisely 
identical to the sportys mark,62 the trademarked term was still 
confusingly similar to the domain name because apostrophes and 
other features commonly used in the alphabet could not be used in 
an Internet domain name.63 
After deciding that the ACPA was applicable to this case and 
that the term sportys was entitled to protection under the Act, 
the Sportys Farm court needed to determine whether the ACPA 
provided a remedy to decide who should have rights to the 
 
58 See Sportys Farm, 202 F.3d at 497. 
While the [FTDA] has been useful in pursuing cybersquatters, cybersquatters 
have become increasingly sophisticated as the case law has developed and now 
take the necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability.  For 
example, many cybersquatters are now careful to no longer offer the domain 
name for sale in any manner that could implicate liability under existing 
trademark dilution case law.  And, in cases of warehousing and trafficking in 
domain names, courts have sometimes declined to provide assistance to 
trademark holders, leaving them without adequate and effective judicial 
remedies.  This uncertainty as to the trademark laws application to the Internet 
has produced inconsistent judicial decisions and created extensive monitoring 
obligations, unnecessary legal costs, and uncertainty for consumers and 
trademark owners alike. 
Id. at 495 (citing S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999)). 
59 See id. at 49697 (noting that the general rule is to apply the law that exists at the 
time of the appeal and finding that the ACPA constitutes a particularly good fit with 
this case). 
60 See id. at 497. 
61 See id. at 49798. 
62 Id. at 498. 
63 See id. at 49798. 
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sportys.com domain.64  This issue involved an analysis of the bad 
faith intent to profit factors outlined in the ACPA.65 
The Second Circuit addressed most of the ACPAs bad faith 
intent to profit factors as well as issues presented in the facts that 
did not fit within the criteria of any enumerated factor.  It 
determined that there was ample and overwhelming evidence that, 
as a matter of law, Sportys Farms [sic] acted with a bad faith 
intent to profit from the domain name sportys.com, as those terms 
are used in the ACPA.66  Addressing the first factor of the bad 
faith intent to profit standard, the court found that neither Sportys 
Farm nor its parent company, Omega, had any intellectual 
property rights in sportys.com at the time Omega registered the 
domain name.67  As the court noted, Sportys Farm was not 
formed until nine months after the domain name was registered, 
and it did not begin operations or obtain the domain name from 
Omega until after [the] lawsuit was filed.68  Regarding the second 
factor of the standard, the court found that the domain name 
sportys.com failed to bear any relation to the legal name of the 
party that registered it, Omega.69  The court addressed the 
ACPAs third bad faith factor and recognized that Sportys Farm 
had not used the website with the sportys.com name until after the 
litigation had begun.70  Applying additional ACPA factors, the 
court determined that Sportys use of the sportys.com domain was 
never noncommercial, or a fair use of the mark, and that 
Sportys bought the name from Omega under suspicious 
circumstances.71 
The Sportys Farm court went beyond application of the 
factors enumerated in the ACPA.  It found that the most 
convincing basis for a finding of bad faith intent to profit stemmed 
from circumstances that were covered within the specific wording 
 
64 See id. at 498. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 498 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2000)). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 49899 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II)). 
70 Id. at 499 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III)). 
71 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV), (VI)). 
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of the ACPA.72  The court found that Omegas intentions to enter 
into direct competition with Sportsmans in the pilot and aviation 
consumer market,73 as well as Hollanders knowledge that the 
term sportys provided a strong link between the Sportsmans 
company and the products it sold in the aviation market,74 meant 
that Omega intended to register sportys.com for the primary 
purpose of keeping Sportsmans from using that domain name.75  
The court also noted that Omegas creation of an unrelated 
business with the name Sportys Farm subsequent to the lawsuits 
filing, as well as Michaels suspect explanation for using the 
sportys.com domain name, demonstrated evidence of bad faith.76 
B. Other Appellate Court ACPA Decisions Since Sportys Farm 
Sportys Farm was the first federal appellate court to apply the 
ACPA and it has since been utilized as strong precedent for 
interpretation of the statute.  In later appellate decisions, the First, 
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have also addressed the ACPA in 
depth and have discussed the bad faith intent to profit factors. 
In Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club,77 
the First Circuit decided a dispute regarding the domain name 
northernlights.com.78  Since 1997, plaintiff Northern Light 
Technology, Inc., used the domain name northernlight.com for 
 
72 See id. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. (noting that Omega created another company named Sportys Farm in an 
unrelated business so that it could (1) use the sportys.com name in some commercial 
fashion, (2) keep the domain name away from competitor Sportsmans, and (3) protect 
itself in any type of trademark infringement claim brought by Sportsmans for use of the 
name).  The court further stated that the explanation given for Sportys Farms desire to 
use the domain name, based on the existence of the dog Spotty, is more amusing than 
credible. Id.  It should be noted, however, that although the court found injunctive relief 
proper on behalf of Sportsmans Market, it found that monetary damages were not 
available. Id. at 501.  In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit upheld the District 
courts determination that the requirement for damages under the FTDA was not present. 
Id. at 500.  Further, the Second Circuit reviewed Connecticut law and deemed that its 
requirements for damages were also not present in this case.  See id. at 50001. 
77 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001). 
78 See id. at 5861. 
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use as an Internet search engine.79  The defendant, unlike the 
defendant in Sportys Farm, had Internet expertise, as it was a 
subsidiary company owned by a Canadian corporation whose 
president, Mr. Burgar, described himself as an Internet 
entrepreneur.80  Specifically, Burgar (also a defendant in the case) 
had, since the mid-1990s, registered thousands of catchy 
domain names . . . the names of popular people and 
organizations.81  He was also president of the subsidiary 
corporation, Northern Lights Club, for which the domain name 
was used.82  Northern Lights Club was an unincorporated 
association with a listed address in Las Vegas, Nevada.83  Its 
stated mission was to bring together devotees of the Northern 
Lights, or aurora borealis, including businesses that take their 
name from the famous celestial phenomenon.84  Despite this 
illustrious description of the organizations intended purpose, 
Burgars club failed to develop a strong following.  In fact, his 
testimony indicated that the club had no actual individual 
members.85  The plaintiff first learned of the existence of a 
website correlating to the northernlights.com domain on March 2, 
1999.86 
Notwithstanding defendants claims of what the 
northernlights.com site was originally intended for, when the site 
went active in April of 1999, it displayed, among other things, a 
search feature for specific words or phrases within the site, links to 
various businesses, and an unauthorized link to the 
northernlight.com website.87  Prior to appeal before the First 
Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
granted a preliminary injunction on grounds, inter alia, that the 
defendant would most likely be found to have operated with a bad 
 
79 See id. at 58. 
80 See id. at 5859 (specifically referring to defendant Jeff Burgar, the President of 
641271 Alberta, Ltd.). 
81 Id. at 59. 
82 See id. at 5859. 
83 Id. at 59. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
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faith intent to profit from use of the northernlights.com domain 
name.88 
Despite the Sportys Farm holding, this may have been the first 
federal appellate decision under the ACPA to address the very 
reason Congress enacted the ACPAto tackle the cybersquatter.  
The defendant in Northern Lights admitted to registering multiple 
domain names containing famous trademarks,89 a modus operandi 
that the ACPA was intended to inhibit and control.90  The court 
noted (1) the defendants multiple registrations, the multiple (and 
possibly conflicting) reasons behind the registration of the domain 
name at issue; (2) the defendants apparent openness to sell the 
northernlight[s].com registration to the plaintiff at the right 
price;91 and (3) a history of disregarding cease-and-desist letters 
from legitimate trademark owners92 to conclude that the 
defendants acted with bad faith and, therefore, affirmed the district 
courts injunction.93 
Although this decision in Northern Lights appears consistent 
with the stated and intended purpose of the ACPA, the query arises 
as to whether the defendant in Northern Lights was a cybersquatter 
per se, or a typosquatter.  A typosquatter is an individual who 
registers domain names that have intentional misspellings of 
marked termsa behavior that may be a derivation of a 
cybersquatter.94  Although the Northern Lights court faced this 
 
88 See id. at 61 (citing N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115
20 (D. Mass. 2000)). 
89 See id. at 65. 
90 See supra note 6. 
91 N. Light Tech., 236 F.3d at 65. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at 6566. 
94 See The Word Spy (defining typosquatter as [a] person who registers one or more 
Internet domain names based on the most common typographical errors that a user might 
commit when entering a companys registered trademark name.), at 
http://www.wordspy.com/words/typosquatter.asp (n.d.); Definitions: typosquatting, at 
http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/ sDefinition/ 0,,sid26_gci342237,00.html (n.d.). 
Typosquatting is a form of Internet cybersquatting, based on the probability 
that a certain number of Internet users will mistype the name of a Web site . . . 
when surfing the Web. Typically, a typosquatter will register several possible 
input errors for a brand name Web site known for its high traffic, and then 
monitor to see how many clicks a day each of their typo domain names 
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issue, it did not specifically address it, thus leaving room for a 
sophisticated cybersquatter to argue an open question of law not 
yet addressed by a federal court of appeals.  The Northern Lights 
decision unintentionally left the door open for one to find a 
loophole in the ACPA. 
Any discrepancy left open by Northern Lights, however, was 
quickly cleared up in Shields v. Zuccarini,95 where the Third 
Circuit had its first opportunity to deal with a cybersquatter.  
There, the defendant, John Zuccarini, was notorious for his 
registration of many domain names that bore an all-too-striking 
resemblance to famous organizations.  Mr. Zuccarini was the 
stereotypical cybersquatter the ACPA was intended to prevent.  
During this litigation, as well as during another well-known case,96 
Mr. Zuccarini learned about the effect and purpose of the ACPA 
and about domain name disputes. 
Before discussing Mr. Zuccarini further, a comparison must be 
made to Dennis Toeppen.97  If John Zuccarini is the poster boy for 
the type of behavior the ACPA sought to prevent, then Dennis 
Toeppen, a pre-ACPA cybersquatter, is the godfather of domain 
name cyberpiracy.98  Briefly stated, Toeppen was involved in 
 
receives, and use the information to sell advertising for the sites that receive a 
high volume of accidental traffic. 
Id.  See also Lisa T. Oratz, Trademarks and the Internet (Typosquatters register domain 
names that are nearly identical to the actual domain names used by other organizations.  
The slight differences between the domain names are intended to catch Web users who 
make typographical or punctuation errors when entering a Web sites address.), at 
http://www.perkinscoie.com/resource/ecomm/trademarks.htm (n.d.). 
95 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001). 
96 See Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. CIV.A.00-4055, 2000 WL 
1622760 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2000). 
97 See Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic, Inc. 
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  These were Mr. Toeppens two most 
famous cases. 
98 Some commentators have even gone so far as to label several of the ACPA bad faith 
intent to profit factors as Toeppen factors.  See, e.g., Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of 
Your DomainAn Overview of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, COMM. 
LAW (ABA, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2000, at 3, 35 (commenting on each of the ACPAs 
bad faith intent to profit factors, and implying that some are based on the actions of Mr. 
Toeppen), available at http://www.abanet.org/forums/communication/comlawyer/ 
spring00/mishkins.html. 
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several pre-ACPA disputes over domain names.99  He registered 
many popular terms as domain names and offered to sell them well 
above market value.100  He also used clever tactics, such as 
attempting to persuade plaintiffs not to seek remedies in courts,101 
and placed pictures and information about localities having a name 
similar to a protected mark online, thus trying to legitimize his 
behavior.102  None of the courts that heard Toeppens cases 
condoned his actions.103  Since his last well-known case in 1998,104 
as well as the enactment of the ACPA, the cybersquatting world 
has not heard much about Toeppen, so it must now rely on the 
stories and defenses of John Zuccarini. 
In Shields v. Zuccarini,105 the plaintiff was a cartoon artist who 
marketed his graphics under the label Joe Cartoon.  The plaintiff 
used this label to identify and market his work for fifteen years 
prior to the inception of litigation and even registered the domain 
name joecartoon.com to display his product online.106  The 
defendant, a domain-name wholesaler, i.e., one who acquires 
multiple domain names with the intent to profit from them,107 
registered various domain names similar to the plaintiffs.108  The 
defendant registered joescartoon.com, joecarton.com, 
joescartons.com, joescartoons.com, and cartoonjoe.com.109  
Initially, the content posted by the defendant on these sites 
consisted primarily of advertisements for credit card companies 
 
99 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1227. 
100 See, e.g., Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230. 
101 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319. 
102 See id. 
103 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 132427; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 123941. 
104 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1316. 
105 254 F.3d 476, 479 (3d Cir. 2001). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at n.1. 
108 See id. at 47980; Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-4055, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2001), affd, No. 01-1476, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9247 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2002).  This case is discussed in greater detail infra text 
accompanying notes 159, 161165.  In Electronics Boutique Holdings, the District court 
noted that many other claims have been brought against Zuccarini by entities such as 
Radio Shack, Office Depot, Nintendo, Hewlett-Packard, the Dave Matthews Band, the 
Wall Street Journal, Encyclopedia Britannica, Guinness beers, Spiegels, the Sports 
Authority, Yahoo!, and Calvin Klein.  Id. at *7. 
109 Shields, 254 F.3d at 480. 
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and other websites.  The defendant received revenue when these 
sites were viewed.110  After the plaintiff sent cease-and-desist 
letters to the defendant, however, the sites contents quickly 
changed into a self-proclaimed political protest providing a general 
rant about various topics.  These topics ranged from the idea that 
joecartoon.com is a web site that depicts the mutilation and 
killing of animals in a shockwave based cartoon format to 
thoughts on the policies of domain name registries, and even the 
ACPA itself.111  Interestingly, all of Mr. Zuccarinis political views 
were directed at his legal adversary as well as the legal tools and 
procedures involved in the domain name system.112 
One of Zuccarinis defenses to the ACPA claim was that he 
was not cybersquatting, the type of behavior the ACPA was 
intended to deter.113  Rather, he was typosquatting.114  He argued 
that this conduct was outside the scope of the ACPA, thus 
shielding him from liability.115  The Third Circuit quickly rejected 
this defense after noting that a primary legislative intent of the 
ACPA was to deter those who often register well-known marks to 
prey on consumer confusion by misusing the domain name to 
divert customers from the mark owners site to another site.116  
The Third Circuit recognized that the ACPA 
covers the registration of domain names that are identical 
to distinctive or famous marks, but it also covers domain 
names that are confusingly similar to distinctive or 
famous marks.  A reasonable interpretation of conduct 
covered by the phrase confusingly similar is the 
intentional registration of domain names that are 
misspellings of distinctive or famous names, causing an 
Internet user who makes a slight spelling or typing error to 
reach an unintended site. . . . [Zuccarinis] intent was . . . to 
register a domain name in anticipation that consumers 
 
110 See id. 
111 See id. (describing defendants pages of POLITICAL PROTEST) (citing Shields v. 
Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 63536 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). 
112 See id. 
113 See Shields, 254 F.3d at 483. 
114 Id.; see also supra note 94. 
115 See id. 
116 Id. at 484 (citing S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 15 (1999)). 
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would make a mistake, thereby increasing the number of 
hits his site would receive, and, consequently, the number 
of advertising dollars he would gain.117 
The Third Circuit deemed Zuccarinis conduct a classic example 
of a specific practice the ACPA was designed to prohibit.118  The 
Third Circuit held that Zuccarini possessed the requisite bad faith 
intent to profit for an action under the ACPA, based on Zuccarinis 
lack of intellectual property rights in the Joe Cartoon mark or 
any use of it in connection with the bona fide offering of goods or 
services.119  In addition, the court found that by diverting 
consumers from the plaintiffs website, the defendant harmed the 
good will associated with the Joe Cartoon mark.120  Zuccarini 
raised an absolute defense to the bad faith intent to profit standard 
by insisting that his use of the websites, on which his political 
protest appeared, was an exercise of his First Amendment right to 
free speech.121  He argued that such use was protected from 
liability under the ACPAs safe harbor provision.122  The Shields 
court quickly rejected this defense, relying on the district courts 
response that Zuccarinis claim was nothing more than a spurious 
explanation cooked up purely for this suit.123 
In another case applying the ACPA, Virtual Works, Inc. v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc.,124 the Fourth Circuit found that 
Virtual Works acted with bad faith intent to profit when it 
registered the domain name, vw.net.  The term VW is 
commonly associated with the Volkswagen automobile, and those 
at Virtual Works who registered this domain name knew that 
Internet users might believe vw.net was a website associated 
with the carmaker.125  In fact, Virtual Works contemplated selling 
the domain name for a lot of money should Volkswagen be 
 
117 Id. at 48384 (citation omitted). 
118 Id. at 484. 
119 Id. at 48485. 
120 See id. at 485. 
121 See id. at 485. 
122 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000)). 
123 Id. at 485 (quoting Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). 
124 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001). 
125 See id. at 266. 
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interested in its ownership.126  Several Volkswagen dealerships 
made offers to Virtual Works for ownership of the domain 
name.127  In response, a representative of Virtual Works 
telephoned the main Volkswagen office stating that if Volkswagen 
did not buy the rights to vw.net within twenty-four hours, the site 
would be sold to the highest bidder.128 
Applying the ACPA, the Fourth Circuit found that Virtual 
Works possessed bad faith intent to profit and affirmed the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginias judgment to 
turn the domain name over to Volkswagen.129  Bad faith was 
established based on Virtual Works desire to profit from 
Volkswagen at the time of registration by registering a domain 
name with overwhelming similarities to the trademarked term.130  
The court also cited the terms of Virtual Works offer to 
Volkswagen, distinguishing it from legitimate domain name sale 
techniques.131 
Subsequently, and without reference to Virtual Works, the 
Fourth Circuit found that a bad faith intent to profit existed in 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney.132  The 
defendant, a former Internet executive who owned 5060 domain 
names, registered peta.org and began using the site to mock 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).133  The web 
site displayed a web page entitled People Eating Tasty Animals 
and provided information supporting issues PETA opposed.134 
The Fourth Circuit upheld a district court determination135 that 
Doughney possessed a bad faith intent to profit when registering 
PETA as a domain name.136  In doing so, the Fourth Circuit 
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 26667. 
128 See id. at 267. 
129 See id. at 271. 
130 See id. at 26970. 
131 See id. at 270. 
132 263 F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2001). 
133 See id. at 36263. 
134 See id. 
135 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 
(E.D. Va. 2000), affd, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001). 
136 See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 36869. 
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utilized all of the enumerated factors in the ACPA.137  Specifically, 
the Fourth Circuit noted that Doughney was an individual who 
registered multiple domain names identical or similar to the 
marks or names of famous persons and organizations, he 
possessed no legitimate intellectual property rights or claim to 
identity in the PETA term, had no prior use of that term, and his 
use of the People Eating Tasty Animals website was a 
commercial use.138  Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district courts finding that Doughney clearly intended to confuse, 
mislead and divert [I]nternet users into accessing his web site 
which contained information antithetical and therefore harmful to 
the goodwill represented by the PETA Mark.139  It also found that 
by recommending that PETA attempt to settle the dispute, 
Doughney showed bad faith intent to profit.140 
The Fifth Circuit had its opportunity to interpret and apply the 
ACPA in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd.,141 in which 
the defendants registered ernestandjuliogallo.com, a domain 
name essentially identical to the protected title, name, and mark of 
the plaintiffs popular wine selling and distribution business.142  In 
its analysis, the Fifth Circuit applied the ACPA consistently with 
the interpretations of other federal circuit courts.  The Fifth Circuit 
relied on the Sportys Farm decision, the Shields decision, and the 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals decision in affirming 
a finding of bad faith intent to profit.143 
Since registering the Ernest & Julio Gallo trademark in 1964, 
the plaintiffs had registered various similar terms and domain 
names but had not registered the specific term at issue.144  They 
also spent hundreds of millions of dollars in promoting their brands 
 
137 See id. 
138 See id. at 369. 
139 Id. (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 920). 
140 See id. 
141 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002). 
142 See id. at 276. 
143 See id. at 277. 
144 See id. at 272; E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 
1035 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (noting the various domain names that the plaintiff registered for 
its winemaking business, including GALLO.DE, EJGALL.DE, ERNEST-JULIO-
GALLO.COM, GALLOWINERY.COM, EJGALLO.COM, and GALLOWINE.COM). 
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and brand names.145  The defendant was a limited partnership that 
developed Internet address names.146  It registered over two 
thousand Internet domain name addresses, many of which could be 
associated with well-known businesses, and placed some of these 
addresses for sale on eBay with asking prices in excess of 
$10,000.147  The defendants admitted that the 
ernestandjuliogallo.com domain name was valuable because of 
the goodwill that Gallo had developed in its name and that when 
this domain name was registered, the defendants hoped that Gallo 
would contact them about the domain name, so they could assist 
Gallo in some way.148  Approximately six months subsequent to 
commencement of this lawsuit, the defendants used the offending 
site to discuss the lawsuit, problems associated with the 
consumption of alcohol, and alleged misrepresentations by 
corporations.149 
Applying the ACPA, the court found that the defendants could 
not claim any intellectual property rights in the domain name.150  
This domain name was not used by or used to identify the 
defendant Spider Webs in any manner prior to the litigationan 
important characteristic to consider because it is conduct that 
relates to three separate factors of the ACPA bad faith intent to 
profit analysis.151  More importantly, Spider Webs initial use of 
the domain name subsequent to the commencement of the 
litigation undermined any claim it might have proffered to show 
that use of the ernestandjuliogallo.com domain name was not in 
bad faith.152  The Fifth Circuit also based its finding of bad faith 
intent to profit on Spider Webs awareness of the goodwill of the 
plaintiffs mark, its specific desire to offer the domain name for 
sale, the defendants primary function as an entity that registered 
 
145 E. & J. Gallo, 286 F.3d at 272. 
146 Id. at 272. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 See id. at 27273. 
150 See id. at 275. 
151 See id.  The ACPA bad faith intent to profit factors that this type of conduct covers 
are specified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)(III) (2000). 
152 Id. at 276 (citing Sportys Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsmans Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 499 
(2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000)). 
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and resold domain names, and its efforts to sell these domain 
names for prices well above market value.153 
C. Appellate Decision Analysis 
The Virtual Works court appeared to face a similar type of 
infringer as the Sportys Farm court faced; however, this type of 
defendant does not appear to be the stereotypical cybersquatter that 
the ACPA aims to deter.154  Nevertheless, the facts each circuit 
court faced seemed within the realm of criteria for which the 
ACPA was intended.  Although the Sportys Farm court found the 
most convincing basis for a determination of bad faith in facts not 
specifically within the ACPAs enumerated factors, it nevertheless 
applied the ACPAs factors to the defendants actions.155  The 
Virtual Works court, however, did not individually analyze these 
various factors, but instead decided the case based on the facts in 
the aggregate.  While the Virtual Works court used the ACPA as a 
guide in making its determination of bad faith intent to profit, it 
appeared to base its conclusion on a traditional likelihood of 
confusion test with a twist of the factors noted in the ACPA.156 
Regardless, when confronted with the stereotypical 
cybersquatter, the federal appellate courts appear to stop the 
cybersquatter right in his tracks.  The Shields case is a perfect 
example of a federal appellate courts use of the ACPA to control a 
cybersquatter.157  Relying on the Sportys Farm precedent, the 
Shields court realized that defendant John Zuccarini was a true 
cybersquatter and chose to make an example out of him.158  In 
analogous situations, both the E. & J. Gallo Winery court and the 
Northern Lights Technology court decided to do the same.  Despite 
Sportys Farm being known as the origin for precedent, Shields, E. 
& J. Gallo Winery, and Northern Lights Technology epitomize the 
type of individual the creators of the ACPA had in mind prior to its 
 
153 See id. at 27677. 
154 See, e.g., Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
155 See Sportys Farm, 202 F.3d at 49899. 
156 See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 26770 (4th Cir. 
2001). 
157 See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001). 
158 See id. 
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enactment.  Sportys Farm, despite the ultimate finding of bad 
faith, considered an alleged infringer that did not engage in the 
same type of behavior as the stereotypical cybersquatter.  Shields, 
E. & J. Gallo Winery, and Northern Lights Technology, on the 
other hand, demonstrated that in situations involving true 
cybersquatters, application of the ACPA is uniform.  It appears that 
the holding of Sportys Farm will be applicable in situations 
involving both the cybersquatter and those who do not fit neatly 
into the definition.  Sportys Farm, therefore, provides the best 
basis for ACPA interpretation. 
D. District Court Determinations 
Similar to federal appellate decisions, district courts have also 
found bad faith intent to profit present in various cases.  There 
appears to be little, if any, deviation from federal precedent and 
Sportys Farm. 
One district court case, Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v. 
Zuccarini,159 involved the infamous John Zuccarini, of, among 
others, Shields v. Zuccarini160 fame.  As in Zuccarinis other 
brushes with the ACPA, several domain names similar to the 
plaintiffs protected mark were at issue.161  Plaintiff Electronics 
Boutique, the well-known retailer of video and computer games 
and accessories, had intellectual property rights in the terms 
electronics boutique and EB.162  Zuccarini registered various 
domain names with very similar spellings to these marksoften 
only one letter off from the actual word.163 
In analyzing the ACPA claim, the Electronics Boutique court 
found that Zuccarini acted with a bad faith intent to profit from his 
multiple registrations of domain names similar to plaintiffs 
mark.164  The court applied the ACPA bad faith intent to profit 
 
159 No. 00-4055, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2001), affd, No. 01-
1476, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9247 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2002). 
160 See Shields, 254 F.3d at 476. 
161 Elecs. Boutique, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719, at *2*3. 
162 See id. at *6*7. 
163 See id. at *8. 
164 See id. at *19 (Mr. Zuccarinis bad-faith intent to profit from the domain 
misspellings is abundantly clear.). 
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factors and found that Zuccarini had no legitimate purpose for 
registration of the domain names and that he intended to prey on 
the confusion and typographical and/or spelling errors of Internet 
users . . . for his own commercial gain.165 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, in 
Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick,166 also found a bad faith intent 
to profit in a case involving an individual who registered multiple 
domain names that were identical or closely similar to protected 
marks.  The defendant registered domain names with both actual 
spellings and common misspellings of the plaintiffs well-known 
law firm,167 as well as domain names containing names of similar 
firms.168  The plaintiff, an established law firm, litigated for the 
rights to the domain names.169  On the web sites linked to the 
domain names, the defendant had established web pages 
containing offensive messages about the plaintiff, such as Were 
your good paid friends!; Best friends money can buy; Greed is 
good; We bend over for you . . . because you bend over for us!; 
and Parasites No Soul . . . No Conscience . . . No Spine . . . NO 
PROBLEM.170  The defendant also included links to other sites 
containing offensive phrases, thus suggesting that the plaintiff 
affiliated with certain unpopular causes and organizations.171  The 
 
165 Id. at *20. 
166 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000). 
167 See id. at 1127 (Wick registered the domain names www.morrisonfoerster.com, 
www.morrisonandfoerster.com, www.morrisonforester.com, and 
www.morrisonandforester. com . . . .). 
168 See id. at 1132 (Wick registered the names of over ninety law firms, including: 
www.HollandandHart.com, www.McKennaandCuneo.com, 
www.BakerandHostetler.com, [and] www.HallandEvans.com.). 
169 See id. at 112628. 
170 Id. at 1128. 
171 See id. (The defendant included links such as 
www.LetsDoSomeIllegalSteroids.com, www.GestapoTactics.com, 
www.HolocaustMemorial.com, www.MightAsWellFireUpThe Ovens.com, 
www.JewKike.com, www.NoIrishNeedApply.com, www.NativeAmericansAre 
FinallyGettingTheirLandBack.com, [and] 
www.WhatExcuseDoWeGetToUseForTheNext ColumbineHighSchoolTragedy.com.). 
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defendant described his actions as a method of messing and 
hav[ing] fun with big law firms and corporate America.172 
The Morrison & Foerster court found that the defendant 
possessed a bad faith intent to profit when registering the domain 
names.173  Analyzing the ACPAs factors, the court based its 
determination on: (1) the defendants lack of any rights or interest 
in the registered names; (2) the lack of any prior use by the 
defendant of the domain names; and (3) the likelihood that the 
names as registered would cause public confusion, divert Internet 
surfers, and disparage the plaintiffs reputation.174  Although the 
defendant did not make a specific offer to sell the domain names to 
the plaintiff for a high price, the court nevertheless found that the 
defendant acted in a manner for financial gain based on an external 
factor to the situation.  One of the domain names that defendant 
owned was entitled NameIsForSale.com, which the court found 
sufficient to support a reasonable inference of intent to sell the 
domain names for a profit.175  The court overlooked any actual 
action by the defendant to transfer ownership of any registered 
domain name, recognizing that he could not have had time to 
negotiate potential sales of the registered names because he was 
too busy litigating domain name disputes.176 
Behavior that did not fall within any of the specified ACPA 
factors supplemented the finding of bad faith and quite possibly 
secured the courts ultimate determination.  The Morrison & 
Foerster court frowned heavily upon the defendants parody of 
law firms and other corporations and did not approve of his 
personal, vengeful tactics and misappropriation of protected terms 
and marks.177 
In Victorias Cyber Secret L.P. v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,178 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida found 
 
172 Id. at 1133 (citing the defendants testimony in which he admitted to partaking in this 
behavior for comical reasons in an attempt to get even with companies after a contractual 
relation with a company was terminated). 
173 See id. at 113334. 
174 See id. at 113132. 
175 Id. at 1132. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. at 1133. 
178 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
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that a bad faith intent to profit existed where the plaintiff registered 
multiple domain names containing the words victoria and 
secret.179  The defendant, Victorias Secret, is the maker of 
intimate apparel for women.180  The plaintiff claimed that it 
registered the domain names to publicize its affiliation with 
Playboy model Victoria Silvstedt, and as such, would have both a 
legitimate and fair use of any domain name including the terms, 
victorias, sex, and secret.181  The plaintiff, however, never 
used the domain names at issue.182  Additionally, the domain 
names were offered for sale to the defendant for an amicable 
transfer agreement to the plaintiffs attorney.183  Nevertheless, 
similar to the circuit and district court decisions discussed above, 
the court found that the plaintiff violated the ACPA and had no 
valid intellectual property rights in the registered terms.  In 
addressing the plaintiffs fair use defense, the court noted that one 
would need to be sophisticated in Internet adult entertainment to 
connect Victoria Silvstedt with the domain name, thereby negating 
the defense that no likelihood of confusion existed.184  The court 
also noted that consumer confusion may arise because the domain 
names at issue would potentially divert Internet consumers 
looking for Victorias Secrets website to its own websites.185  An 
additional weak point in the plaintiffs case was that any affiliation 
it may have had with Silvstedt was mutually terminated.  In fact, 
Silvstedt filed documents with the court stating that she never 
consented to the plaintiffs use of her name.186  Thus, any possible 
justification the plaintiff may have claimed for maintaining rights 
to use the words Victorias and secret was clearly negated.187 
In an interesting case, CNN v. cnnews.com,188 the plaintiff was 
known worldwide as the originator of the cable news channel.189  
 
179 Id. at 1349. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 1344, 1353. 
182 Id. at 1343 (citing the pleadings filed in the case). 
183 Id. 
184 See id. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. at 1348. 
187 See id. 
188 177 F. Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001) (mem.). 
189 See id. at 51112. 
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The defendant, a subsidiary of a conglomerate based in China, 
used the cnnews.com website to provide news and information 
to Chinese-speaking individuals worldwide.190  The defendant 
claimed that this domain name was chosen because it stood for 
China News that cn is widely used and understood to be an 
abbreviation for the country name China and cn is the top-level 
Internet domain for China.191  The defendant further contended 
that its target audience was located entirely within China, despite 
the courts observation that there was a significant amount of 
English language content on both the cnnews.com site and various 
linked sites.192 
Applying the ACPA factors, the CNN court found a bad faith 
intent to profit.193  The court found that the defendant had no 
intellectual or fair use rights in the domain name cnnews.com and 
had not used this particular name for any reason prior to its 
registration.194  Despite the CNN courts finding that several ACPA 
factors supported bad faith, the courts most compelling reason for 
this finding was based on the ACPAs fifth factor: the intent to 
divert consumers to another site with the purpose of damaging the 
goodwill of the mark.195  The court found that the defendant went 
well beyond its stated target audience by placing a substantial 
amount of English on the site, as well as registering the domain 
name with a .com, thereby ending with a domain registry from 
the U.S.196  The court concluded, therefore, that the defendant 
possessed a bad faith intent to profit.197 
 
190 Id. at 512. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 See id. at 52327.  It should be noted that this case is interesting for reasons beyond 
the scope of this article, as this case noted that the bad faith intent to profit standard is 
applicable to the in rem provisions of the ACPA. Id. at 510. See also BroadBridge Media, 
L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty 
Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425 (E.D. Va. 2000).  The ACPA enacted 
in rem provisions to address problems that mark holders were having in gaining personal 
jurisdiction over cybersquatters. CNN, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
194 See CNN, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 52526. 
195 See id. at 525. 
196 See id. at 526. 
197 See id. 
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Similarly, in Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. v. Vogue 
International,198 the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey found that the defendant possessed a bad faith intent to 
profit because the defendant registered several domain names 
containing the word vogue.199  Plaintiff, owner of the popular 
Vogue magazine, sought to register a domain name including this 
term.200  In addition to finding that the defendant lacked any 
intellectual property rights in terms included in the domain names, 
the court found a bad faith intent to profit because, by the 
defendants own admissions, he sought to capitalize from the 
notoriety of the plaintiffs protected mark.201 
Recently, in Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo 
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona,202 the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia found that the defendant had a bad 
faith intent to profit from registration of barcelona.com and was 
thus liable under the ACPA.203  The plaintiff, the registrant, sought 
a declaratory judgment against the defendant, the City Council of 
Barcelona, Spain.204  Interestingly, this case involved application 
of the ACPA to a foreign trademark.205  The court found a bad 
faith intent to profit based on the behavior of the owners of the 
barcelona.com domain name in registering approximately sixty 
web sites containing city names and . . . well over 100 names in 
total.206  The barcelona.com site consisted of information about 
the city of Barcelona, but this information was provided through 
third party affiliates of barcelona.com, and not barcelona.com, Inc. 
itself,207 thus making it a mere conduit to other sites.208  The 
corporation that registered this domain name was incorporated 
 
198 123 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D.N.J. 2000). 
199 See id. at 794. 
200 See id. at 79293. 
201 See id. at 800. 
202 189 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
203 See id. 
204 See id. at 369. 
205 See id. at 373 (It is untenable to suppose that Congress, aware of the fact that the 
Internet is so international in nature, only intended for U.S. trademarks to be protected 
under the Anticybersquatting statute.). 
206 Id. at 374. 
207 Barcelona.com, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 374. 
208 Id. at 375. 
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three years after the actual registration of the domain name and 
eight months after the domain names owner first offered to 
negotiate for ownership of the name.209  The registrants of the 
domain name did not have any employees or assets other than the 
name itself, and changed its contact information during the 
negotiations between the parties for the site.210  These 
circumstances, in addition to a lack of any intellectual property 
rights in the term Barcelona, led the court to find that the 
registrant acted in bad faith.211 
Various additional cases demonstrate the intolerance courts 
hold for those registering domain names with a bad faith intent to 
profit.  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York found a bad faith intent to profit where a defendant registered 
multiple variations of a protected mark, operated a website offering 
the same type of services that a mark holder offered, and even 
provided links on the site to the protected mark holders 
competitors.212  The same court also found a bad faith intent to 
profit where the defendant, among other things, held a domain 
name hostage until the plaintiff agreed to pay an exorbitant 
amount of money for the ownership, rental, or other property 
interest in the domain name.213  Likewise, the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of California found a bad faith intent to 
profit in Porsche v. Spencer,214 where the plaintiff, maker of the 
Porsche brand automobile, faced off against a registrant of multiple 
domain names for rights to the name, porschesource.com.215  
The defendant in Porsche was the typical cybersquatter who had 
no rights in the domain name at issue, no real prior use, and 
registered many other domain names with words similar to 
 
209 See id. at 37475. 
210 See id. at 375. 
211 See id. at 37576. 
212 Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Rosado, 122 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(providing an example of how the ACPA applies to a situation where a domain name 
registrant used the words of a protected mark to partake in the same type of business in 
which a mark holder had become established). 
213 BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (basing a finding of bad faith intent to profit on ACPA statutory factors, but 
finding this aspect of the case particularly relevant to the inquiry). 
214 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
215 See id. at 102839. 
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protected marks.216  Based on these criteria, the court found that 
the defendant had exhibited a bad faith intent to profit when 
registering the domain name.217 
Despite the holdings of the above noted cases, there may be 
one area in which courts have exhibited even less tolerance for 
those who use protected terms in domain names.  This type of 
situation may arise if a domain name, similar to a protected term, is 
registered for the purpose of disseminating pornographic material.  
The use of a popular term to promote an adult entertainment 
website occurred in Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions, Inc.,218 
where the defendant used the domain name 
barbiesplaypen.com.219  The plaintiff, maker of the incredibly 
popular Barbie doll, sued the defendant for registering this domain 
name and displaying pornographic material on a web page that 
popped up when the domain name was accessed.220 
The Mattel court found a bad faith intent to profit when the 
defendant registered this domain name because the defendant, as 
with many registrants in the previously mentioned cases, lacked 
any intellectual property rights, had no legitimate reason for using 
the name Barbie, and there was no prior, noncommercial, or fair 
use of the name Barbie.221  The defendant never espoused a 
desire to sell the domain name to the plaintiff.  The courts main 
concern, however, was that the defendants use of the domain 
name would tarnish the Barbie doll image because Internet users 
would be directed to the site after plugging the term Barbie into 
an Internet search engine.222  This last factor provided the strongest 
basis for the Mattel court to conclude that the defendant acted with 
a bad faith intent to profit. 
While this Article identifies cases applying the ACPA that 
found a bad faith intent to profit, there are also many cases in 
which no violation of the ACPA was found.  For instance, where 
 
216 See id. at 104146. 
217 See id. at 1047. 
218 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (mem.). 
219 See id. at 1624. 
220 See id. at 162324. 
221 See id. at 163233, 1638. 
222 See id. at 163334. 
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both the plaintiff and the defendant had rights to use the term 
Chambord in connection with the sale of coffee, foods, and other 
products, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania found that no violation of the ACPA existed.223  
Additionally, in Greenpoint Financial Corp. v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co.,224 the plaintiff, a nationwide financial institution, 
fought for rights to the domain name greenpoint.com against the 
defendant company who produced the Green Stamps program 
that gained fame in the 1960s and 1970s.225  The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the 
provisions of the ACPA were not violated and that the defendant 
did not act in bad faith because the defendant had a bona fide 
business reason for registering the name.226 
Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos.227 was another 
case in which a federal district court did not find that a bad faith 
intent to profit existed.  This case, however, should be only briefly 
addressed because the facts bear some similarity to other cases in 
which a violation of the ACPA was found.  In Cello Holdings, the 
defendant, a former musician, registered the domain name 
cello.com because he wanted to register names of musical 
instruments.228  The courts decision notes that the defendant also 
registered other domain names that failed to bear any relation to 
instruments or music and was aware that the plaintiffs company 
used the term cello in its title.229  At the time the defendant 
registered the domain name, there was a myriad of companies that 
had some degree of intellectual property rights in entities identified 
with cello.230  Additionally, the defendant offered the cello.com 
domain name to at least nine of these companies for a price in the 
 
223 Chatam Intern., Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
224 116 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
225 See id. at 408. 
226 See id. at 414. 
227 89 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
228 Id. at 46768. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
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range of $5,000.231  Both parties in Cello Holdings moved for 
summary judgment in their favor.232 
The Cello Holdings court found that the parties presented 
evidence tending both to support and not support a finding of bad 
faith intent to profit.233  The court recognized that the defendants 
conduct was the modus operandi of the stereotypical cybersquatter: 
he registered a domain name that he possessed no rights to and he 
engaged in a pattern of registering domain names that could be of 
interest to others and then trying to sell them.234  Nonetheless, the 
court refused to find that a bad faith intent to profit existed and 
refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
because: (1) the court believed that a reasonable fact finder could 
find that the defendant did not act with an intent to blackmail or 
extort Cello; (2) the defendants offer for sale was a general 
offer rather than one directed at the plaintiff for an exorbitant sum; 
and (3) the term cello has a meaning in the English language, 
and, therefore, the defendant may have had a degree of fair use in 
the term.235 
Cello Holdings appears to concern the type of behavior the 
ACPA intended to deter.  The defendant registered multiple 
domain names and offered them for sale at prices well above 
market value.  The court was still reluctant to find a bad faith intent 
to profit, despite being presented with a defendant who acted in the 
manner of a typical cybersquatter. 
E. A Possible Misapplication of the ACPA 
Despite the previously mentioned cases, demonstrating a 
degree of consistency in ACPA interpretation, there still seem to 
be a number of decisions representing a minority opinion.  In 
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Karpachev,236 for instance, the 
plaintiff, popularly known as TD Waterhouse, was a worldwide 
corporation that provided financial services to over four million 
 
231 Id. at 468. 
232 Id. at 466. 
233 Id. at 474. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 188 F. Supp. 2d 110, 111 (D. Mass. 2002). 
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people and conducted business online with the domain name 
tdwaterhouse.com.237  The defendant, a disgruntled former 
customer of the plaintiff who faced thousands in financial loss due 
to an action of the plaintiff, registered sixteen domain names 
composed of variant misspellings of the name 
tdwaterhouse.com.238  These sites contained web pages accusing 
the plaintiff of various crimes and comparing the plaintiff to the 
Nazis and other intolerable political groups.239  The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff.  It found that defendant Karpachev, a 
perturbed typosquatter possessed bad faith based on his intent to 
tarnish or disparage the [plaintiffs] mark and his admitted 
intent to divert consumers from [the plaintiffs] mark . . . by 
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship or 
affiliation, or endorsement of the site.240  The court also noted 
that the defendant possessed no intellectual property rights in the 
registered domain names and that the domain names he registered 
were confusingly similar to the plaintiffs mark.241 
This seems to be a clear-cut case of the type of conduct the 
ACPA was intended to address: a defendant registering multiple 
variations of a popular and protected term and disparaging it by 
deliberately attempting to undermine the goodwill of the term; this 
is analogous to the situation encountered in the Shields case.  This 
does not appear, however, to be consistent with the above-noted 
precedent, as the decision makes no mention of a desire to profit 
from the registration of such names.  As already noted, the ACPA 
requires a finding of bad faith intent to profit, which is a separate 
and distinct standard from ordinary bad faith.242  Although several 
commentators have distinguished between when a showing of bad 
 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 112. 
240 Id. at 114 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (2000)). 
241 Id. 
242 See Sportys Farm L.L.C. v. Sportmans Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 499 n.13 (2d Cir. 
2000) (noting that bad faith intent to profit are terms of art in the ACPA and hence 
should not necessarily be equated with bad faith in other contexts), cert. denied, 530 
U.S. 1262 (2000); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1125 (D. Minn. 
2000) (distinguishing between a partys bad intent and the bad faith intent to profit 
standard necessary for an ACPA claim). 
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faith intent to profit must be proven and when simply a showing of 
bad faith must be proven,243 the case law on the ACPA has not, to 
date, recognized such a distinction for purposes of application.  
Notwithstanding a possible disposition in favor of the plaintiff 
under traditional trademark or dilution law, Toronto-Dominion 
does not appear to be a case in which the court properly applied the 
ACPA. 
Instead, the court in Toronto-Dominion Bank should have paid 
attention to the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesotas 
decision in Northland Insurance Cos. v. Blaylock.244  In Northland 
Insurance, like in Toronto-Dominion Bank, the court was 
presented with a defendant who was a disgruntled former customer 
of an company with a protected mark.245  The defendants main 
gripe was that he was not fully reimbursed for damages to his 
yacht, which he had insured through the plaintiffs company.246  As 
a result, he registered two domain names, one of which was 
northlandinsurance.com, to house complaints and criticism of 
[the] plaintiffs business.247 
Despite the uncanny resemblance between the domain name 
that the defendant registered and the name of the plaintiffs 
company, the Northland Insurance court found no violation of the 
ACPA.248  Perhaps more importantly, it refused to recognize the 
defendant as the type of individualthe cybersquatterthat the 
ACPA was intended to address.249  The Northland Insurance 
courts reluctance to accept the plaintiffs argument that the 
defendant was indeed a cybersquatter, coupled with the 
 
243 See Slonaker, supra note 37, at 134 (outlining the standard the ACPA sets forth for 
trademarked terms and noting that it also protects against the domain name registration 
of the name of living persons without their consent if there is a specific intent to profit 
from the selling of that name). 
244 See Northland Ins., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. 
245 Id. at 1114. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id at 1125. 
249 Id. (The defendant does not fit the classic cybersquatter profile because there is no 
evidence that he has registered other variants of plaintiffs name or previously has 
registered marks as domain names.). 
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noncommercial purpose of the defendants website, led to the 
determination that no violation of the ACPA took place.250 
The Northland Insurance court decision seems like the more 
logical outcome for a case where a court is faced with an 
individual whose primary purpose in registering a particular name 
is to make a statement, regardless of whether or not the statement 
is negative.  The ACPA specifically provided a safe harbor 
defense251 and one of the bad faith intent to profit factors 
specifically takes into account any type of fair use that an 
alleged infringer may possess.252  The uses by the defendants in 
both Toronto-Dominion Bank and Northland Insurance appeared 
to be noncommercial expressions of their personal distaste for 
particular entities.  Use of the ACPA to suppress these types of 
ideas may tread on areas protected by freedom of expression 
principles.  Although First Amendment concerns are beyond the 
scope of this Article, the types of behavior observed in these two 
cases do not seem to be the type that the ACPA was enacted to 
prevent. 
F. District Court Application of the ACPA and Comparisons to 
Appellate Courts 
Other than Karpachev, federal district courts interpretation of 
bad faith intent to profit under the ACPA has been consistent.  
District courts have interpreted and applied the factors embodied 
within the ACPA in the same manner as the federal appellate 
courts, and for the most part, have adhered to Sportys Farm as the 
most influential precedent in ACPA actions. 
When the display of pornographic material is not involved, 
there appears to be three main issues courts will examine when 
encountered with a claim regarding a domain name dispute: (1) the 
registrants intellectual property rights in terms included in the 
registered domain name, (2) the registrants willingness or offer to 
sell the domain name above market value, and (3) the number of 
 
250 Id. at 112425. 
251 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000); Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of 
Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001). 
252 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV). 
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domain names registered by the registrant.  One could contend that 
these three issues more or less define the stereotypical 
cybersquatter, and the very type of person that the ACPA was 
intended to stop. 
The title of this Article asked the question when is bad faith 
intent to profit really bad faith?  In reviewing cases, both at the 
appellate and the district court level, the answer to this question 
seems to revolve around the three issues highlighted in the 
preceding paragraph.  As demonstrated in several earlier examples, 
once a court finds a lack of intellectual property rights in a given 
term, coupled with a desire to sell the domain name and/or 
multiple registration, it seems likely that a finding of bad faith 
intent to profit will occur.  This method of application by federal 
courts helps explain why application of the ACPA, to date, seems 
consistent. 
While those like John Zuccarini have been pummeled by the 
ACPA in federal courts, the courts still find no violation when a 
particular domain name, similar to a popular and protected mark, is 
innocently acquired.  This sums up the original purpose of the 
ACPA and demonstrates that it has been applied as intended.  It, 
therefore, appears as if district court interpretation of the ACPA, 
with the exception of one or two distinct decisions, has been 
uniform in application and has modeled itself after its appellate 
precedent. 
III. THE QUESTION: HAS THE ACPA REALLY CHANGED 
ANYTHING? 
As noted ad nauseum, the ACPA was enacted to provide 
further protections for domain name owners seeking to ward off 
cybersquatters.  Since its enactment, the ACPA has satiated those 
commentators concerned with the changes deemed necessary to 
handle domain name disputes, and who offered suggestions for 
improvement.253  Despite these general criticisms of the 
 
253 See, e.g., Carl Oppedahl, Advise Clients on Internet Domain Names that Infringe 
Trademarks, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1995, at 5 (making recommendations for intellectual 
property practitioners, intellectual property organizations, and business with popular 
brand names to better improve the domain name dispute situation); Carl Oppedahl, 
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applicability of trademark law to domain name disputes prior to the 
ACPA, deference must be afforded to its applicability, and as such, 
defense of traditional trademark principles is proper.  Some would 
say that ordinary and contemporary trademark law was not an 
appropriate mechanism to handle the situations for which the 
ACPA was created.  This was because of an apparent difference 
between the evils that traditional trademark law was intended to rid 
and the way in which the Internet Domain Name System (DNS) 
works.254  This difference lies in the belief that trademark law was 
never intended to promote the monopolization of a particular mark 
or word,255 while DNS provides for the exclusive use of a 
particular term in a secondary level domain. 
It is true that many have called for change and reform in the 
space where trademark law meets the Internet.256  Before one 
overly criticizes the application of traditional trademark law to 
 
Courts Grapple With Remedies in Internet Domain Name Trademark Suits, N.Y.L.J., 
Oct. 22, 1996, at 5 (analyzing the 1996 Federal Anti-Dilution Law that was commonly 
used against cybersquatters as the lead basis of a civil suit for domain name mark 
infringement prior to the enactment of the ACPA). 
254 See, e.g., Blasbalg, supra note 14, at 585 (Trademark law and domain name 
concepts conflict in a number of ways.  These conflicts make the application of 
trademark law to cybersquatting cases difficult.). 
255 See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 133 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(1st Cir. 2000) (Holders of a famous mark are not automatically entitled to use that mark 
as their domain name; trademark law does not support such a monopoly.), affd, 232 
F.3d 1. 
256 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Kleiman, Comments of the Domain Name Rights Coalition to 
Second Revised Substantive Guidelines Concerning Administrative Domain Name 
Challenge Panels, at http://www.gtld-mou.org/notice-9703/0024.html (last modified 
Dec. 6, 1997) (offering commentary on various changes believed to be needed to be 
implemented into the Internet Domain Name Scheme at the time of publication); Milton 
Mueller, Trademarks and Domain Names: Property Rights and Institutional Evolution in 
Cyberspace (Important revisions need to be made in the policies and laws regarding 
domain name-trademark conflicts.  Current law and policy clearly recognize that domain 
names can be used to violate legitimate trademark rights.  That recognition must be 
balanced with an explicit recognition that trademark claims can be used to abuse 
legitimate domain name usage.), at http://istweb.syr.edu/~mueller/study.html (n.d.); 
United States Patent & Trademark Office, Report to Congress: The Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act of 1999, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/ 
tmcybpiracy/repcongress.pdf (last visited June 16, 2002) (detailing various problems that 
Congress had to deal with prior to the enactment of the ACPA). 
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DNS,257 an analysis of other legal theories appropriate for handling 
such a situation should be undertaken.  Trademark law was used 
from the inception of litigation concerning domain name disputes 
and has been both adapted and expanded by the creation of the 
ACPA to better handle domain name disputes.258  To make a 
comparison in laypersons terms, those who often criticize our 
system of government for various reasons are often countered with 
the infamous Winston Churchill maxim that democracy is the 
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have 
been tried from time to time.259  During the mid-1990s, when 
courts first faced legal questions regarding the proper use and 
ownership of terms and phrases used in Internet addresses, 
trademark law was the best available vehicle for courts to use and 
provided the most equitable results.260  Changes were necessary to 
 
257 See, e.g., John Carson et al., Claim Jumping on the Newest Frontier: Trademarks, 
Cybersquatting, and the Judicial Interpretation of Bad Faith, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 27, 
28 (2000) (Traditional trademark and federal anti-dilution laws were insufficient to 
solve the problem. . . . [T]he effectiveness of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(FTDA) had been limited because cybersquatters were adapting their activities to avoid 
liability.); Gutierrez, supra note 22, at 155 ([T]rademark infringement law has been an 
ineffective way of curbing cybersquatters.). 
258 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).  The ACPA uses terms to guide courts when faced 
with a domain name dispute.  For instance, the ACPA uses the term confusingly similar 
as a way for a court to find that bad faith exists. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I).  Although this 
standard is distinct from the traditional likelihood of confusion examination, it does 
demonstrate a link between the ACPA and traditional trademark law, and serves as a 
platform for one to observe ACPAs logical basis. Cf. id. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
259 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150:19 (3d ed. 1979). 
260 There are several pre-ACPA cases pertaining to the application of trademark 
infringement and dilution claims in domain name disputes. See, e.g., Avery Dennison 
Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999);  Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. 
Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast 
Entmt, Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 
1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th 
Cir. 1998); Shades Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 1999); 
CCBN.com, Inc., v. C-call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 1999); Hasbro, Inc. v. 
Clue Computing, Inc. 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 
993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 
F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. 
Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Cardservice Intl, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 
1997); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); MTV Networks v. 
Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Blasbalg, supra note 14, at 566 (Before the 
enactment of the ACPA the most successful remedy available to the victims of 
cybersquatting was the use of federal trademark law.). 
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allow trademark law to keep up with technological innovations that 
may not have been foreseeable at the time contemporary principles 
of trademark law were initially articulated in the federal courts 
over forty years ago.261  At the time that trademark law was 
developing in regards to this topic, it was the correct tool to resolve 
disputes. 
But has the ACPA or the cases applying it affected traditional 
trademark principles in a different way from what traditional 
trademark law was created for in the first place?  The ACPA was 
designed to rid a particular evil: the prominence of 
cybersquatters262 taking well-known names and using them as 
Internet addresses.  Cases applying the ACPA have used the 
statutes bad faith intent to profit factors as a tool to determine 
which party has the more legitimate right to the domain name.263  
It is the application and extension of such bad faith intent to profit 
factors that have served as a protective shield against the 
cybersquatter.264 
 
261 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).  This is 
a landmark case in trademark law where the Second Circuit promulgated factors to 
properly assess whether a substantial likelihood of confusion was present: 
(1) the degree of strength the plaintiff has in his mark; 
(2) the similarity between the marks; 
(3) the types of people who are most likely to purchase what the two parties 
offer on the 
market; 
(4) any evidence which tends to prove that there is actual confusion present; 
(5) the intent of the defendant; 
(6) the proximity of the products; 
(7) the likelihood that the prior owner would bridge the gap; 
(8) the quality of defendants product. 
Id. 
262 See supra notes 68 and accompanying text. 
263 See, e.g., Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos L.D.T.A., 273 F.3d 14, 28 (1st Cir. 
2001) (Congress has defined in the ACPA what it means to lack a legitimate interest in a 
domain name under U.S. law.); Ford Motor Co. v. Lapertosa, 126 F. Supp. 2d 463, 465 
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (providing an example of a case in which a court has highlighted most, 
if not all, of the bad faith intent to profit factors of the ACPA en route to a 
determination). 
264 See Matthew Edward Searing, Whats in a Domain Name? A Critical Analysis of 
the National and International Impact on Domain Name Cybersquatting, 40 WASHBURN 
L.J. 110, 131 (2000) (Due to the ACPA, cybersquatters will have a harder time avoiding 
court penalties because it is harder to predict how courts will determine bad faith 
intent.). 
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Instead of amending traditional trademark principles, the 
ACPA has been used as a substitute for trademark law.  In 
addition, since its inception in November 1999, it has been used as 
a mechanism to prevent the overlap of traditional trademark 
concepts with the system of domain name rights and registration.  
Perhaps this is why the Second Circuit in Sportys Farm seemed so 
eager to apply the newly created ACPA.265  Not only was it 
deemed the appropriate law to handle the facts presented, but it 
also allowed the court to shift the emphasis that traditional 
trademark concepts had on DNS to a newly created statutory cause 
of action.266  Since the Sportys Farm case, as noted in this Article, 
other courts have applied the ACPA in greater depth to deal with 
domain name disputes rather than basing claims on trademark 
infringement or the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 
another statute created primarily for the purpose of combating 
cybersquatters.267  Instead of amending the general concepts of 
trademark law until a certain branch was narrowly tailored for 
domain disputes, a new law was created.  This law not only 
attempts to fix a problem not specifically addressed in prior 
legislation, but also appeases those critics who believed the 
concepts of traditional trademark law were stretched too far to deal 
with the DNS problem.268 
 
265 See id. at 12529 (noting the Sportys Farm courts as well as the district court of the 
Zuccarini decision to be examples of courts willingness to accept and apply the bad 
faith factors of the ACPA). 
266 See P. Wayne Hale, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act & Sportys 
Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsmans Mkt., Inc., 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 205, 212 (2001) (The 
ACPAs remedies are a significant extension beyond those available under traditional 
trademark law.). 
267 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).  This provision of the Lanham Act states that an 
owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon 
such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another persons 
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark 
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark . . . .  To 
show dilution, a plaintiff must show that (1) a mark is famous; (2) that the defendant 
made commercial use of the mark; (3) that the defendants use of the mark began 
subsequent to the mark becoming famous; and (4) that the defendants use of the mark 
diminishes the marks ability to identify and distinguish goods and services. See 
Panavision Intl L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998). 
268 See Searing, supra note 264, at 118 (noting that trademark principles applied prior to 
the ACPA were vague and sometimes inapplicable to domain disputes). 
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The ACPA deals specifically with an Internet domain name 
that is the subject of a dispute, but a term, word, or phrase, in and 
of itself, is not a trademark.  Instead, a trademark takes into 
account other featuresessentially anything adding to the 
distinctiveness of a mark identifying a particular item.269  It is the 
groupings of words, symbols and logos that is the trademark and 
not the word by itself.  It is these groupings of words and logos 
that are non-existent when it comes to domain names, thus 
providing a lack of protection for mark owners in certain 
circumstances where the defendants conduct fails to rise to the 
level of infringement or dilution.270  This is true even though the 
most valuable asset a company owns is its name.271  In fact, a 
company name used as a domain name has a significant and 
measurable monetary value, especially when the name is used to 
trade on the borrowed good will and reputation of another 
party.272  The lack of protection for mark holders serves as a gray 
area and a void that the ACPA was intended to fill and, as 
demonstrated in practice, actually does fill.273  Of course, not all 
situations fall within this gray area, and thus the outcome in these 
cases, regardless of whether or not a party bases a claim on the 
ACPA, the FTDA, or another trademark theory, will remain the 
same.  For instance, in the most clear-cut and egregious situations 
(i.e., the defendantsuch as Zuccarini274 or Toeppen275is a true 
cybersquatter), the cybersquatter will face defeat regardless of the 
claims source.  Additionally, those types of cases involved 
 
269 The term trademark is defined as a word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol 
used by a manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of 
others. . . . To receive federal protection, a trademark must be (1) distinctive rather than 
merely descriptive, (2) affixed to a product that is actually sold in the marketplace, and 
(3) registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 
1483 (6th ed. 1990). 
270 See, e.g., Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 626 (6th Cir. 
1998); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999). 
271 Martin, supra note 3, at 803. 
272 Id. at 813. 
273 A majority of the cases highlighted in this Article illustrate this principle. 
274 See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001); Elecs. Boutique Holdings 
Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-4055, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2001), 
affd, No. 01-1476, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9247 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2002). 
275 See Panavision Intl LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic, Inc. 
v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
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infringers of a protected mark, further ensuring the defendants 
demise. 
The original provision of the Lanham Act, section 1125(a) of 
the United States Code (the statute initially used for domain name 
disputes), codified common law trademark infringement claims.276  
This section regulates the proper use of trademarks and notes that 
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof used in a manner likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of such person with another person277 is a basis for a 
trademark infringement claim.  Unlike the Lanham Act, however, 
the ACPA specifically limits itself to domain names, having no 
more general applicability.278  Contrary to what some 
commentators may believe,279 there is a difference in analysis 
between the bad faith intent to profit under the ACPA and the 
likelihood of confusion test.  The aforementioned cases rely 
primarily on the factors outlined in the ACPA, which is 
specifically tailored to domain name disputes; while these cases 
could have applied more traditional trademark law, as codified in 
the Lanham Act, the claimants found more salient recourse by 
using the ACPA and having the court apply the factors therein. 
Although the stated purpose of the ACPA was to protect 
trademark owners confronted with cybersquatters,280 it appears that 
its interpretation has been broadened to protect marks used by 
those who lack the mens rea of the stereotypical cybersquatter.281  
Perhaps the ACPAs reach has become too broad and has been 
applied beyond the scope of its intended purpose by punishing 
domain name registrants who make the unintentional mistake of 
 
276 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
277 Id. 
278 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (limiting its scope to a person who registers, 
traffics in, or uses a domain name). 
279 See Martin, supra note 29, at 600 (conveying that not only is a bad faith inquiry 
tantamount to the likelihood of confusion standard, but that ACPA plaintiffs must 
establish a likelihood of confusion even if bringing a claim based solely on a trademark 
dilution theory). 
280 See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999). 
281 Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Karpachev, 188 F. Supp. 2d 110, 11314 (D. Mass. 
2002) (finding that the defendant, whose intent was to tarnish or disparage the 
plaintiffs mark, was in violation of the ACPA). 
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obtaining a domain name that includes a protected mark.  As 
illustrated by the cases highlighted in this Article, however, it 
appears that courts are properly applying the ACPA, providing 
appropriate deference to the fair use defense, and achieving the 
most equitable results.  Thus, the ACPA appears not only to have 
served its purpose of stopping the evil cybersquatter but has also 
provided a fair and just framework for courts to adjudicate domain 
name disputes.282 
Of course, like any law, the ACPA has not gone unscathed and 
isolated from criticism.283  Nonetheless, the ACPA has laid the 
framework for consistent interpretation and a somewhat uniform 
application, which thereby creates stability for mark owners and 
was precisely what mark owners needed from the ACPA. 
CONCLUSION 
The ACPA was intended for a specific purpose: to rid the 
world of the pesky cybersquatter who harmed both protected mark 
holders as well as consumers.  The ACPAs bad faith intent to 
profit standard is very straightforward and serves as a means to 
combat this specific problem.  Federal courts, at both the appellate 
and the district court level, have applied a uniform interpretation of 
the ACPA factors.  In certain circumstances, federal courts have 
applied, either directly or indirectly, notions of traditional 
trademark law in reaching an ultimate determination.  The court 
decisions discussed in this Article appear to have reached the most 
equitable results, while taking into account both parties claims to 
rights in particular names. 
 
282 See supra notes 67, 11, 1821, 23. 
283 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 9 (noting various criticisms of the APCA from 
various sources); Kevin Eng, Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of 
Trademark Rights in Domain Names Across Top Level Domains, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 7, 7778 (2000) (describing the ACPA as a formidable federal weapon, the use of 
which can lead to results as coercive as cybersquatting itself as it strengthens large 
companies already superior positions, [and] weakens smaller companies positions); 
Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil 
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 88285 (2000) (making 
observations about the ACPA, e.g., the title is entertaining, the law is too much and 
too late, and goes too far). 
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The ACPA has become a productive law that has been 
followed and interpreted in the same manner for which it was 
intended.  An examination of the highlighted case law 
demonstrates that substantial deviation from current interpretation 
seems unlikely.  The ACPA was the congressional answer to 
problems associated with cybersquatters, and as seen by most of 
the examples in this Article, has been adequate.  Most importantly, 
the type of behavior the ACPA sought to deter has been effectively 
controlled. 
